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No Justification for Lottery Losers
Christoph Kelp
Abstract
Igor Douven has recently developed a challenge for accounts
of justification according to which beliefs about lottery losers
are never justified. This paper argues that champions of such
accounts can rise to Douven’s challenge and, what’s more, that
they can turn Douven’s argument around in the sense that they
can legitimately take it to provide a vindication of their pre-
ferred view.
1 Introduction
Consider the following three statements:
Sufficiency. If p is very likely to be true given one’s evidence, then one
has justification to believe that p.
Closure. If one has justification to believe each member of a set of propo-
sitions Γ and one knows that Γ entails a further proposition ϕ, then
one has justification to believe ϕ.
No Contradictions. One does not have justification to believe an obvious
contradiction.
Individually, each of these three propositions is intuitively highly
plausible. As it turns out, however, they are jointly inconsistent. To
see this, notice that no matter how high we set the standards for sat-
isfaction of the predicate ‘very likely’, there will be some fair lottery
with exactly one winner such that it is very likely on one’s evidence
that each ticket will lose. So suppose that a ticket will very likely
lose if the chances that it will lose is at least (n− 1)/n and let l be a
fair lottery one knows to have n tickets and exactly one winner. By
Sufficiency, for each ticket in l, one has justification to believe that it
will lose. By Closure, one has justification to believe that all tickets
in l will lose. Since one also knows that l has exactly one winner,
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by a further application of Closure, one has justification to believe
that all tickets in l will lose and that exactly one ticket in l will win.
However, this is an obvious contradiction and so, by No Contradic-
tions, one does not have justification to believe it. It thus becomes
clear that the three claims are jointly inconsistent. This is Kyburg’s
[1961, 1970] lottery paradox.
No Contradictions is nearly universally considered to be non-
negotiable (though see Priest 1998). Whatever is wrong with the lot-
tery paradox, it is not No Contradictions. This leaves Closure
and Sufficiency. While early solutions to the lottery paradox have
tended to focus on Closure, there are a number of excellent rea-
sons to believe that denying Closure amounts to too high a cost and
won’t provide a satisfactory solution to the paradox anyway.1 If so,
we will of course have to give up Sufficiency.
It is commonly thought that if we deny Sufficiency, we will also
have to accept an account of justified belief that satisfies the following
claim:
No Justification. For each ticket in a given lottery, one does not have
justification to believe that it won’t win.
However, in a recent paper, Igor Douven [2008] argues that the step
from the denial of Sufficiency to the thesis that any adequate ac-
count of justified belief must satisfy No Justification may be too
quick. More specifically, Douven argues that, for each account of
justification that satisfies No Justification (henceforth also ‘NJ ac-
count’), there is an alternative (henceforth also ‘Douven alternative’)
that has a lot more going for itself than one may initially have thought.
In fact, Douven alternatives are attractive enough to settle champions
of NJ accounts with the challenge of having to show their view is in-
deed preferable.
This paper aims to show that champions of NJ accounts can rise
to Douven challenge and that they can even turn Douven’s argument
into a vindication of No Justification. In order to achieve this I will
first outline Douven’s argument (section 2) and deal with some im-
mediate problems on behalf of Douven (section 3). I will then argue
that the proper target of the argument is not No Justification but
a certain thesis about our epistemic goal Douven takes for granted.
Once the problematic thesis has been replaced by a better alterna-
tive, it becomes clear that Douven’s argument serves to vindicate No
Justification rather than present a challenge to it (section 4).
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2 Douven’s argument
Douven’s argument starts from the following thesis about our general
epistemic goal:
Truth Goal. Our epistemic goal consists in amassing a large body of
beliefs with a favourable truth–falsity ratio [2008: 205].2
As Douven is quick to point out, Truth Goal is widely accepted
among epistemologists and thus appears to be as solid a starting
point for his argument as one may hope for.3
He goes on to argue for a condition of adequacy for accounts
of justification according to which an account of justification is ade-
quate only if it is conducive to our epistemic goal, in the sense that
any agent who adopts the account as a policy of belief management
is likely to attain or make progress towards attaining our epistemic
goal [2008: 208]. This condition of adequacy supports the following
principle for comparatively assessing accounts of justification:
Comparison. For any two accounts of justification, J and J’, that are alike
in all other relevant respects, if J is more conducive to our epistemic
goal than J’, then J is preferable to J’ [2008: 210].
With these theses in play, let’s look at Douven’s recipe for con-
structing Douven alternatives to NJ accounts:
Douven Alternative. The Douven alternative, DA, to a given NJ account,
NJ, is an account of justification that ‘reads just like [NJ] except that it
has an additional clause saying that, given a “sufficiently large” fair
lottery with exactly one winner, one is justified to believe of all but
one of the tickets that they will lose’ [2008: 212].
It is now easy to show that Douven alternatives are preferable to
their corresponding NJ accounts. Let l be any fair lottery with n tick-
ets (where n is sufficiently large in the relevant sense) and exactly one
winner and let S be any agent. If S adopts NJ, he will not believe of
any ticket that it won’t win. As opposed to that, if he adopts its Dou-
ven alternative, DA, he will believe of n − 1 tickets that they won’t
win. Since the lottery has but one winner, it follows that S is guar-
anteed at least n− 2 true beliefs and at most two false beliefs. S thus
makes better progress towards having a large body of beliefs with
a favourable truth–falsity ratio if he adopts DA than NJ. By Truth
Goal, S makes better progress towards attaining the epistemic goal
if he adopts DA than NJ. That is to say that DA is more conducive
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to our epistemic goal than NJ in the sense at issue in Comparison.
Since DA differs from NJ only in that it allows n − 1 beliefs about
lottery losers, DA and NJ are alike in all other relevant respects. By
Comparison, DA is preferable to NJ. We have a reason to prefer Dou-
ven alternatives to NJ accounts and hence a reason to believe that No
Justification is false [2008: §4].
Douven considers a number of objections to this argument of
which two will be important for present purposes. According to the
first, Douven alternatives are unacceptably ad hoc as the crucial extra
clause receives no independent motivation. In response, Douven ar-
gues that, in the philosophy of science, the reason ad hoc theories are
considered unacceptable is that they are thought to prevent us from
achieving the goal of science. If there were reason to think that ad
hoc theories are beneficial to our achieving the goal of science, there
would be no reason to have reservations about them. Moreover, what
goes for scientific theories also holds, mutatis mutandis for theories of
justification. If so, the ad hocness charge cannot be made to stick
[2008: 214].
The second objection claims that Douven alternatives license an
unacceptable kind of epistemic arbitrariness. To see this recall that
according to Douven alternatives one can justifiably believe of n− 1
tickets that they will lose. However, there is no more reason for be-
lieving of any one set of n− 1 tickets that each member will lose than
there is reason to believe of any other set of n − 1 tickets that each
member will lose. One will have to choose the tickets of which one
believes that they will lose arbitrarily. According to Douven alter-
natives, these arbitrarily chosen beliefs will be justified. However, it
is intuitively highly implausible that arbitrarily chosen beliefs could
ever be justified. In other words, Douven alternatives entail the coun-
terintuitive:
Epistemic Arbitrariness. For some non-empty proper subset ∆ of tick-
ets in sufficiently large lotteries with exactly one winner, arbitrarily
chosen beliefs that each member of ∆ will lose can be justified.4
By way of response, Douven first points out that we have not seen
good arguments that there is a problem with epistemic arbitrariness.
He then goes on to argue that in other domains, arbitrariness is com-
patible with justification. For instance, consider the following ‘Lot-
tery Game’:
Lottery Game. You are faced with the choice of opening any number of
a set of n doors. You also know there is one Euro behind n− 1 doors
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and nothing behind one door. The goal of the game is to receive
money and avoid having to pay money. The rules of the game are
that so long as you don’t choose to open all doors, you will get all
the money you find and you will have to pay one Euro for every door
behind which you don’t find any money. However, you must not
choose to open all doors. If you do, you will get nothing.
The Lottery Game is a practical analogue of beliefs about lottery out-
comes. Where in the epistemic case, the goal is to amass lots of true
beliefs and avoid false beliefs, in its practical analogue, the goal is to
amass monetary gains and avoid losses. Possible beliefs in the epis-
temic case have possibly opened doors in the practical case as their
counterparts. Finally, the constraint that one cannot justifiably be-
lieve a contradiction is mirrored by the rule that one must not choose
to open all doors. Now, it is not hard to see that, in the Lottery Game,
you will be entirely justified to arbitrarily choose to open some non-
empty proper subset of doors. In fact, it will be most rational for
you to choose to open n− 1 doors here. Douven’s point now is that
it would be odd if this kind of arbitrariness were compatible with
justification in the practical domain but not in the epistemic domain.
In view of this, Douven claims that the onus is on champions of NJ
accounts to show that epistemic arbitrariness is incompatible with
justified belief. So long they haven’t done this, we do not have suffi-
cient reason for accepting any given NJ account.
3 Douven Alternatives: Strong and Weak
Douven alternatives promise us high returns on our epistemic goal
compared to their NJ cousins. For any lottery with n tickets, Douven
alternatives deliver a minimum of n− 2 true beliefs at a maximum of
two false beliefs, while on NJ accounts, we gain no true beliefs at all.
As Douven has argued, given that all else is equal, this means that
Douven alternatives are preferable to NJ accounts.
Let’s start with an argument that not all else is equal between
NJ accounts and Douven alternatives. Unlike NJ accounts, Douven
alternatives are incompatible with the conjunction of Closure and
the following highly intuitive principle relating justification and evi-
dence:
Necessity. One has justification for believing that p only if p is sufficiently
likely to be true given one’s evidence (where a proposition is suffi-
ciently likely given one’s evidence only if it is more than 50% likely
on one’s evidence).5
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To see how this works, let’s return to our lottery l with n tickets and
exactly one winner. Suppose that S has adopted a Douven alternative
and believes of n − 1 tickets of l that they will lose. Of course, S
knows that if all the n − 1 tickets will lose and there is exactly one
winner, the remaining ticket, i, will win. Since, according to Douven
alternatives, S’s beliefs about n − 1 tickets are all justified, since S
knows (and hence believes justifiably) that exactly one ticket will win,
and since S knows that all this entails that i will win, by Closure, S
has justification for believing that i will win. However, S also knows
that the chances that i wins are 1/n. For any n ≥ 2, the probability
that i will win on S’s evidence is not larger than 50%. Since there can
be no doubt that a lottery is ‘sufficiently large’ in the sense at issue
in Douven Alternative only if it features at least two tickets, by
Necessity, S does not have justification for believing that i will win.
We can thus derive a contradiction from a given Douven alternative,
Closure and Necessity. One of the three will have to go.
Douven has effectively two options at this stage. He can, robustly,
reject or at least restrict either one of Closure and Necessity. Alter-
natively, he can, concessively, move to a weaker kind of alternative
that is compatible with Closure and Necessity. Let’s look at the
prospects for the robust response first.
Recall that, Douven responded to the ad hocness charge against
Douven alternatives by arguing that we have reason to think that ad
hocness is a vice of an account of justification only to the extent that
we have reason to think that it is detrimental to our achieving the
epistemic goal. Since Douven alternatives are not thus detrimental,
we have no reason to consider their ad hocness a vice. Now, still in the
same spirit, Douven might consider supplementing Douven Alter-
natives with the following further ad hoc restriction on Necessity:
Strong Douven Alternative. The strong Douven alternative, DAS, to a
given NJ account, NJ, is an account of justification that reads just like
NJ except that it has the following two additional clauses: (i) given a
sufficiently large fair lottery with exactly one winner, one is justified
to believe of all but one of the tickets that they will lose and (ii) one is
justified in believing of the remaining ticket that it will win (despite
the fact that this is insufficiently likely on one’s evidence).
Here too we have no reason to think that ad hocness is a vice because
it is conducive to our epistemic goal as we can now reap the benefits
of a minimum of n− 2 guaranteed true beliefs.
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Unfortunately for Douven, there is reason to think that opening
the flood gates of ad hocness is not a good idea after all. To see this
notice that we can improve on Strong Douven Alternative once
more by offering the following alternative ad hoc restriction:
Alternative Alternative. The alternative alternative, AA, to a given NJ
account, NJ, is an account of justification that reads just like NJ except
that it has an additional clause saying that, given a sufficiently large
fair lottery with exactly one winner, one is justified in believing of all
tickets that they will lose and that there is exactly one winner (despite
the fact that this is an obvious contradiction).
In other words, instead of accepting No Contradictions and opting
for ad hoc restrictions on the extent of justified beliefs about lottery
losers one can hold as well as on Necessity, here we simply go for
an ad hoc restriction on No Contradictions. Notice that the ben-
efits of adopting alternative alternatives will outweigh the benefits
of adopting strong Douven alternatives. After all, we will now be
able to reap exactly n− 1 guaranteed true beliefs. True, we will also
have to settle for exactly one false belief. However, on strong Dou-
ven alternatives, we incur a (n − 1)/n chance of adding two false
beliefs to our stock of beliefs and only an 1/n chance of adding no
false beliefs. It is not hard to see that, before long, adopting an al-
ternative alternative is virtually certain to be more conducive to our
epistemic goal than even strong Douven alternatives. If we have no
reason to think that ad hoc restrictions constitute a vice so long as
they are conducive to our epistemic goal, there should be no worries
about alternative alternatives. On the contrary, given that they are
most conducive to our epistemic goal, we should embrace alternative
alternatives wholeheartedly.
Before moving on, let me consider a couple of possible moves
Douven might make to avoid this result. First, he might object that
any account of justification that licenses justified belief in contradic-
tions will do extremely badly when it comes to being conducive to
our epistemic goal since anything follows from a contradiction and
so, by Closure, any proposition will be justified. However, this ob-
jection may be circumvented by simply adding a further ad hoc clause
to Alternative Alternative according to which Closure does not
hold for beliefs in contradictions.6 Second, Douven might venture to
restrict Comparison in such a way that preferability attaches only to
accounts of justification that are significantly more conducive to our
epistemic goal. But the question remains how this restriction can be
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motivated. An ad hoc approach will simply not work here (not even
by Douven’s lights) since the restriction is counter conducive to our
epistemic goal. Moreover, it would seem that adopting alternative al-
ternatives will be significantly more conducive to our epistemic goal
in the long run. So, it is not even clear that the restriction will do the
trick here either.
Reflection on the practical analogue of lottery cases, the Lottery
Game, further supports the idea that we should favour alternative
alternatives over strong Douven alternatives. Recall that here we have
a goal (making as much money as possible) and a set of rules of the
game (opening all doors means no money, etc.). This corresponds,
respectively, to our goal of amassing a large body of beliefs with
a favourable truth–falsity ratio and any independent constraints on
justification for belief there may be. Now consider Douven’s idea
that, in the epistemic case, making ad hoc adjustments to our account
of justification is acceptable so long as this increases conduciveness to
our epistemic goal. In the practical analogue, this translates into the
idea that the rules of the Lottery Game may be modified in any way
so long as the modification increases conduciveness to the game’s
goal, i.e. the maximisation of players’ gains and minimisation of their
losses. If so, however, there is excellent reason to abandon the rule
that corresponds to No Contradictions, according to which one
must not choose to open all doors. After all, allowing players to
choose to open all doors will be even more conducive to the game’s
goal.
I am still convinced that No Contradictions is not negotiable,
not even in the sense that it is a candidate for further restrictions. As
a result, I take the fact that Douven’s laissez-faire attitude towards
ad hocness would lead us to a restriction on No Contradictions to
show that we should avoid this attitude and disallow ad hoc restric-
tions. By the same token, I’d say that Douven is better off opting for
a concessive response to the above incompatibility result.
A concessive response accepts Closure and Necessity and gives
up the idea that Douven alternatives are preferable to NJ accounts.
We might wonder whether anything is left of Douven’s argument.
Fortunately for Douven, the answer is ‘yes’. After all, while Neces-
sity and Closure will prevent us from reaching the returns on our
epistemic goal Douven alternatives promise, they still allow for some
returns. After all, for sufficiently small m, it is sufficiently likely on
one’s evidence that one of n−m tickets will win the lottery. Compat-
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ibly with Necessity and Closure one can then justifiably believe of
m tickets that they will lose. Accordingly we can define the notion of
a weak Douven alternative as follows:
Weak Douven Alternative. The weak Douven alternative, DAW , to a
given NJ account, NJ, is an account of justification that reads just
like NJ except that it has an additional clause saying that, given a
sufficiently large fair lottery with exactly one winner, one is justified
to believe of a sufficiently small non-empty proper subset7 of tickets
that they will lose.
Notice that weak Douven alternatives will still be more conducive
to acquiring true beliefs and avoiding false beliefs than their cor-
responding NJ accounts. Thus Truth Goal and Comparison will
still favour weak Douven alternatives over their No Justification
cousins.8 In this way, Douven’s challenge for NJ accounts still stands.
4 Turning Douven’s Argument Around
How, if at all, can champions of No Justification rise to Douven’s
challenge? Douven suggests one strategy, viz. to provide an argu-
ment that Epistemic Arbitrariness is really as bad is it intuitively
appears to be. While I don’t want to deny that this is a worthwhile
line to pursue, here I would like to take a slightly different route.
In a nutshell, I will first argue that, properly understood, Douven’s
argument constitutes a reason to think that the following alternative
thesis about our epistemic goal is preferable to Truth Goal:
Knowledge Goal. Our epistemic goal consists in amassing a large body
of beliefs with a favourable knowledge–ignorance9 ratio.10
I will then show that, once Truth Goal is replaced by Knowledge
Goal, Douven’s argument against No Justification will no longer
go through. In this way, Douven himself provides champions of No
Justification with the means to rise to his challenge. What’s more,
I will also argue that the Knowledge Goal version of Douven’s ar-
gument serves to vindicate No Justification.
First things first, I will now argue that Douven’s argument pro-
vides a reason to think that Knowledge Goal is preferable to Truth
Goal. To see how, notice first that while, in the absence of alternative
proposals, Truth Goal may appear intuitively very plausible, once
Knowledge Goal is on the table, it is much less clear that Truth
Goal is indeed the way forward. For starters, Knowledge Goal
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entails Truth Goal in the sense that anyone who attains Knowl-
edge Goal will automatically attain Truth Goal.11 Moreover, the
main difference between the two theses is that in addition to aiming
to avoid false beliefs, we should also aim to avoid other beliefs that
fall short of knowledge. Given a standard account of knowledge as
ungettiered justified true belief (also accepted by Douven), this means
that in addition to false beliefs we should also avoid unjustified be-
liefs and gettiered beliefs. But now notice that both types of belief
are few and far between. We don’t hold many unjustified beliefs and
gettiered beliefs are an even rarer species. Typically, when we form
a true belief, we also form a knowledgeable belief.12 If so, replacing
Truth Goal by Knowledge Goal does not make our epistemic goal
much harder to attain.
These considerations suggest that we will be hard pressed to ar-
gue that there is pre-theoretical reason to favour Truth Goal over
Knowledge Goal.13 Given that this is so, however, if it can be shown
that one view has untoward consequences the other can avoid, this
will constitute exactly the kind of evidence on the basis of which
we may hope to adjudicate between the two views. Douven himself
has already done half of the work. He has provided an argument
showing that Truth Goal has at least one untoward consequence: it
licenses the counterintuitive Epistemic Arbitrariness. If, in addi-
tion, it can be shown that, once we replace Truth Goal by Knowl-
edge Goal, Douven’s argument delivers the denial of Epistemic Ar-
bitrariness, we can rightly take Douven’s argument to show that
Truth Goal has an unwelcome consequence that Knowledge Goal
avoids. As a result, properly understood, Douven’s argument pro-
vides a reason to favour Knowledge Goal over Truth Goal.
To see that once we replace Truth Goal by Knowledge Goal,
Douven’s argument licenses the denial of Epistemic Arbitrariness
notice first that, questions of justification aside, it is widely agreed,
and according to some even ‘intuitively clear’ [Williamson 2000: 249],
that beliefs about lottery losers fall short of knowledge. With this point
in play, let’s run Douven’s argument. Since any account that licenses
Epistemic Arbitrariness allows for justified belief about some lot-
tery losers, the account will lead us add to our stock of non-knowled-
geable beliefs without adding to our stock of knowledgeable beliefs
when adopted. By Knowledge Goal, any such account is counter
conducive to achieving our epistemic goal.14 But now notice that for
any account of justification that licenses Epistemic Arbitrariness,
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EJ, we can define an alternative, NJ, which reads like EJ, except that
it adds No Justification. Unlike EJ, NJ will avoid moving us away
from our epistemic goal. Since the two accounts are alike in all other
relevant respects, by Comparison, NJ will be preferable to EJ. Thus,
with Knowledge Goal in place of Truth Goal, Douven’s argument
will deliver the result that NJ accounts are preferable to Douven al-
ternatives and any other kind of account that licences Epistemic Ar-
bitrariness. Since NJ alternatives entail the denial of Epistemic Ar-
bitrariness, the present version of Douven’s argument licenses the
denial of Epistemic Arbitrariness. In consequence, there is reason
to believe that, properly understood, Douven’s argument provides a
reason to favour Knowledge Goal over Truth Goal.
It is not hard to see that, with Knowledge Goal in place of
Truth Goal, Douven’s argument against No Justification will no
longer go through. The reason for this is that Comparison will now
favour NJ accounts over Douven alternatives, as we have already
seen. Champions of No Justification can thus rise to Douven’s
challenge.
Recall that I have claimed that, properly understood, Douven’s
argument vindicates No Justification. Here is why. First, the ar-
gument provides a reason to favour Knowledge Goal over Truth
Goal. Once Truth Goal is replaced by Knowledge Goal, how-
ever, champions of No Justification can use Douven’s argument
to provide a reason to think that NJ accounts are preferable to any
alternative type of account—i.e. no matter whether it also licences
Epistemic Arbitrariness. After all, any such account will allow for
at least some justified beliefs about lottery losers. Once we have re-
placed Truth Goal by Knowledge Goal, it is easy to see that any
such account will be counter conducive to our epistemic goal when
it comes to beliefs about lottery losers.15 Fortunately, for any such
account, J, we can define an alternative, NJ, that reads just like J,
except that it adds No Justification. NJ will avoid the counter con-
duciveness of J and will therefore, by Comparison, be preferable to
J. In consequence, there is now reason to favour NJ accounts over
any other type of account of justification and No Justification is
vindicated.
5 Conclusion
It comes to light that champions of No Justification can rise to Dou-
ven’s challenge. They can rightly claim that, properly understood,
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Douven’s argument shows that there is reason to prefer Knowl-
edge Goal to Truth Goal and that once Truth Goal is replaced
by Knowledge Goal, the argument against No Justification will
no longer go through. In fact, they can do more than this. They can
turn Douven’s argument around and argue that, rather than exerting
pressure on NJ account, once Truth Goal is replaced by Knowledge
Goal, the argument serves to vindicate No Justification. They can
thus agree that Douven’s argument offers some valuable insights, but
will be quick to add that these insight are rather different than Dou-
ven might have us think.16
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Notes
1 For summary see Douven [2002: 394-5].
2 Douven also offers a more demanding version of our epistemic goal:
Truth Goal∗. Our epistemic goal consists in believing all and only true proposi-
tions [2008: 206].
At the same time, Douven is very clear restricting our epistemic goal any further
than Truth Goal—specifically to interesting and important truths—would be a
mistake. He offers three reasons for this: (i) So doing would introduce a problem-
atic kind of vagueness into the statement of our epistemic goal, leaving us with a
multiplicity of goals, one for each agent. (ii) We may become interested in truths
that are not of interest for us now. Since we typically cannot predict which truths
we will be interested in, we should amass true beliefs regardless of our current
interests. (iii) It does not follow that we should devote every free minute of our
lives to the acquisition of true beliefs. In fact, that we should not do this is best
explained in terms of practical (ir)rationality [2008: 206-7]. In consequence, argues
Douven, our epistemic goal is either Truth Goal or Truth Goal∗. While Douven
leaves open which of the two is the correct statement of our epistemic goal, he
shows that this is unproblematic the differences between the two are of no conse-
quence for the purposes of his argument [2008: 207]. For ease of exposition, I will
be working with Truth Goal here.
3 Other prominent champions of Truth Goal or Truth Goal∗ include William
Alston [1985], Keith Lehrer [1974], Laurence BonJour [1985] and Richard Foley
[1992].
4 As Douven also points out, the intuitive implausibility of Epistemic Arbi-
trariness has also been noted by Dana Nelkin [2000], Kyburg [1997], John Pollock
[1987] and Jonathan Vogel [1990].
5 The kind of doctrine associated with Necessity dates back as far as William
Clifford’s 1877 “The Ethics of Belief”. Contemporary champions of Necessity in-
clude Earl Conee and Richard Feldman [2004], Susan Haack [1993], Jonathan Adler
[2002] and Nishi Shah [2006].
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A couple of further points are worth noting. First, Douven claims that justi-
fication is the kind of standing that turns ungettiered, true belief into knowledge.
If so, it is very plausible that to count as sufficiently likely to be true on one’s ev-
idence a proposition must be very likely on one’s evidence, i.e. the probability of
it’s being true on one’s evidence must be significantly greater than 50%. Second,
my argument is compatible with further restrictions on Necessity. For instance,
it is entirely compatible with there being basic beliefs that can be justified even in
the absence of supporting evidence. In fact, all that I need here are the relevant
instances of Necessity such as: one has justification for believing that some mem-
ber of a set of tickets will win the lottery only if this is sufficiently likely on one’s
evidence.
6 Notice that it may even be possible to motivate this restriction in a non-ad
hoc manner. After all, it would seem that, while it is possible to justifiably believe
certains contradictions (e.g. unobvious ones that are believed on the basis of expert
testimony), no one can have justification for believing any proposition whatsoever.
If so, there may be independent reason to restrict the closure principle to non-
contradictions.
7 A proper subset of tickets is sufficiently small when, compatibly with Neces-
sity and Closure, one can justifiably believe that one of the remaining tickets will
win.
8 Douven also notes that all he needs to get the challenge off the ground is that
one can justifiably believe of at least one ticket that it will lose [2008: 212].
9 ‘Ignorance’ here simply means ‘belief that falls short of knowledge’.
10 In parallel with Douven’s suggestion for a more demanding alternative to
Truth Goal (n.2), we can imagine a more demanding alternative to Knowledge
Goal:
Knowledge Goal∗. Our epistemic goal consists in believing all and only propo-
sitions we know.
Notice that Douven’s arguments against restricting our epistemic goal further to
interesting and important truths (n.2) apply even if our epistemic goal demands
knowledge rather than mere true belief. As a result, we may assume that our
epistemic goal will be either Knowledge Goal or Knowledge Goal∗. At the
same time, it will become clear that my argument goes through even if the correct
statement of our epistemic goal is the more demanding Knowledge Goal∗. Ac-
cordingly, for present purposes at least, we may leave open the question which of
the two statements is correct. Again, for ease of exposition, I will be working with
Knowledge Goal here.
11 Or, at any rate, it will do so given the innocent assumption that the content of
‘favourable’ is at least as strong in Knowledge Goal as it is in Truth Goal.
12 It is worth noting that Douven himself accepts the related thesis that justified
beliefs will typically also qualify as knowledge [2006: 469-70]. Furthermore, in
personal communication, he has expressed his sympathies with the above claim.
13 In fact, it would seem that, if anything, Knowledge Goal has an edge over
Truth Goal on this score. After all, if we had to decide whether we ought to aim
for knowledge or rather for mere true belief, it would seem that the more plausible
answer is ‘knowledge’.
14 Since the same is true for Knowledge Goal∗, the argument will go through
even if the more demanding statement of our epistemic goal is correct (see n.10).
13
15 Again, the same is true if we opt for the more demanding Knowledge Goal∗
(see n.10).
16 Acknowledgements. I am indebted to Igor Douven and an anonymous referee
for a number of very helpful comments on this paper. This work was funded by a
postdoctoral fellowship with Research Foundation – Flanders.
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